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This article is an interdisciplinary comparative research in constitutional law and political
science on government formation. The article analyses the possibility of application of
European model of government formation to models in the post-soviet countries based on
the analyses of the constitutional frameworks and key political, contextual factors that
influence the formation of different types of governments. The research looks at the
processes of government formation in Armenia and Georgia and defines the extent to
which the government formation processes correspond to the broader European experi-
ence. The article provides an empirical basis for further comparative research on coalition
formation in Central and Eastern European as well as newly democratic post-Soviet
countries. Article is based on constitutional system and political practice of Armenia and
Georgia in 2003–2012.
& 2016. Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right
reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The transformation of systems of government has be-
come one of the most significant subjects of research in
political and legal sciences and constitutional design since
the collapse of communist regimes in the early 1990s. It
should be noted, that this important issue was researched
by number of scientists both from the fields of law and
politics (for example, Müller & Strom, 2003, 2010; Lupia &
Strom, 2010; Van Heffen, Kickert, & Thomassen, 2000;
Martin & Stevenson, 2001; Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012
and etc.). These researches were carried out on the for-
mation of different types of governments in Western
European countries. Also these studies have tended to
analyze the traditions of government formation in parlia-
mentary democracies. The electoral systems (majoritarian,
proportional, mixed) and results of parliamentary elec-
tions are the key element for the creation of government
and political parties are the main actors in the process of
government formation in Western Europe. Over the last 20uction and hosting by Else
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).years, the above-mentioned works on Western Europe
have been extended to Central and Eastern Europe. As a
multitude of coalition studies confirm, the models of
government formation and the constitutional procedures
identified in Western Europe can be applied to post-
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, this article attempts to look at the extent to
which these models are generally applicable when applied
to post-soviet countries.
This interdisciplinary article addresses the above-
mentioned question in relation to government formation
issues in Armenia and Georgia. To what extent are the
government formation models established in Western
European and Central and Eastern European countries (in
use) exercised in the South Caucasus region? In this re-
search, author reveals the legal background of Govern-
ment formation in Georgia and Armenia and defines the
types of governments formed in these countries following
parliamentary elections. The reasons for the formation of
one type of government versus another type are discussedvier B.V. All right reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
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motivations that make political parties join the govern-
ment after parliamentary elections. Are they encouraged
with office-seeking, policy-seeking or vote-seeking moti-
vations? What specific contextual factors of these coun-
tries had an impact on the formation of government?
These questions have a large significance for identifying
the basic differences and similarities of government for-
mation processes between the European and newly de-
mocratic post-Soviet countries.
The objectives of this work are to analyze the con-
stitutional procedures of government formation in semi-
presidential and parliamentary systems and evaluate the
character of political negotiations between political parties
for formation of different types of coalition cabinet. We
aim to show the main principles of coalition cabinets in
European and post-soviet countries. In research, we use
qualitative and quantitative methods of research, com-
parative analyses of constitutional norms and other
documents of European and post-soviet countries as well
as statistical analyses of results on parliamentary election
of above-mentioned countries.2. Constitutional design and government formation
2.1. Constitutional framework in Georgia
Constitutional norms for elections, formation of coali-
tion and checks and balances between legislative and ex-
ecutive powers, role of President and Parliament in for-
mation of Government, their responsibility and account-
ability are very important for explaining government for-
mation processes in these countries. Based on the con-
stitutional design, in scientific literature Armenia and
Georgia are considered as semi-presidential countries (The
Constitution of Georgia, 1995). Constitution of Georgia
defines that the President of Georgia shall be the Head of
State of Georgia and shall lead and exercise the internal
and foreign policy of the state. The President of Georgia
shall be also the higher representative of Georgia in for-
eign relations (The Constitution of Georgia, 1995). This
constitutional norms show that president of Georgia is not
only head of state, but she/he has a strong power in ex-
ecutive branch of state. Constitution notes that the Gov-
ernment of Georgia shall ensure the exercise of the ex-
ecutive power, the internal and foreign policy of the state
in accordance with the legislation of Georgia. It is clear
that Government are authorized only ensure the exercise
of the executive power, when the President personally
exercises executive power. Thus internal and foreign policy
of the state is not an exclusive competition of Government
of Georgia. The second significant issue is that the Gov-
ernment shall be responsible before the President and the
Parliament of Georgia. This constitutional norm confirms
that responsibility of government is divided between
President and Parliament and formation of government is
not connected to Parliament as in many parliamentary
systems.
The President has strong powers in executive branch,
but formally head of the Government the is Prime Ministerwho shall determine the directions of the activity of the
Government, organize the activity of the Government,
exercise co-ordination and control over the activity of the
members of the Government, submit report on the activity
of the Government to the President and be responsible for
the activity of the Government before the President and
the Parliament of Georgia (The Constitution of Georgia,
1995). Composition of government shall be also formed
with active participation of the President. Constitution
defines that the Prime Minister shall appoint other mem-
bers of the Government by the consent of the President, be
authorized to dismiss the members of the Government.
And next significant issue determines role of President is
that the Government and the members of the Government
shall withdraw the authority before the President of
Georgia and not before the Parliament of Georgia.
The President of Georgia has very strong power in
working process of Government. The President of Georgia
shall be authorized to convene and preside over the sit-
tings of the Government with regard to the issues of ex-
clusive state importance. Decision adopted at the sitting
shall be formed by the act of the President. It is important
that there is not defined in the constitution what are “is-
sues of exclusive state importance” and usually President
shall determine issues of state importance and convene
and preside over the sittings of the Government. Practice
shows that President Saakashvili has been always initiator
of sitting of Government on these issues.
The constitution of Georgia allow to the President be
active part of Government formation after Presidential and
Parliamentary election. According the constitution, after
taking the oath by the President of Georgia, the Govern-
ment shall withdraw the authority before the President of
Georgia. The President shall uphold the withdrawal of the
authority of the Government and be entitled to charge the
Government with the exercise of the responsibilities until
the appointment of a new composition. There must be
noted that government withdraws the authority before the
President and not before Parliament of Georgia.
Authority of the Government after the consultations
with the Parliamentary Factions shall choose a candidate
of the Prime Minister, whereas the candidate of the Prime
Minister the candidates of the members of the Govern-
ment by the consent of the President within a term of 10
days. Within 3 days from the end of the above mentioned
procedure the President of Georgia shall submit the com-
position of the Government to the Parliament for
confidence.
Government of Georgia needs confidence from the
Parliament. Within a week from the submission of the
composition of the Government by the President of
Georgia the Parliament shall consider and vote the issue of
declaration of confidence to the composition of the Gov-
ernment and the Governmental program. In case a com-
position of the Government and its governmental program
do not gain the confidence of the Parliament, the President
of Georgia shall submit the same or a new composition of
the Government to the Parliament within a term of a
week. In case a composition of the Government and the
program of the Governmental thereof do not gain the
confidence of the Parliament for three times, the President
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Minister within a term of 5 days or appoint the Prime
Minister without consent of the Parliament, whereas the
Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers by the consent
of the President of Georgia within a term of 5 days as well.
In such a case the President of Georgia shall dissolve the
Parliament and schedule extraordinary elections (Con-
stitution of Georgia, 1995).
2.2. Constitutional framework in Armenia
The President of the Republic of Armenia has an almost
the same powers as in Georgia. The President of Armenia is
the head of the state, shall strive to uphold the Constitu-
tion and to ensure the regular functioning of the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial powers. The President of the
Republic shall be the guarantor of the independence, ter-
ritorial integrity and security of the Republic of Armenia.
Despite the Georgian President the President of Armenia
do not directly exercises the internal and foreign policy of
the country and there is the second important actor in
executive power are Government and Prime-minister.
Armenian constitution defines the almost the same
procedure for government formation. The President shall,
on the basis of the distribution of the seats in the National
Assembly and consultations held with the parliamentary
factions, appoint as Prime Minister the person enjoying
confidence of the majority of the Deputies and if this is
impossible the President of the Republic shall appoint as
the Prime Minister the person enjoying confidence of the
maximum number of the Deputies. The President of the
Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister within ten days
after acceptance of the resignation of the Government. The
Government shall be formed within 20 days after the ap-
pointment of the Prime Minister. Thus, formally President
has to consider results of parliamentary elections for ap-
pointment of Prime-minister and formation of the gov-
ernment of Armenia. At the same time, the President has
strong role in executive power: President shall appoint to
and dismiss from office the members of the Government
upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, shall
accept the resignation of the Government on the day of the
first sitting of the newly elected National Assembly, of the
assumption of the office by the President of the Republic,
of the expression of the vote of no confidence to the
Government, of not giving approval to the program of the
Government, of the resignation of the Prime Minister or
when the office of the Prime Minister remains vacant. The
Government shall develop and implement the domestic
policy of the Republic of Armenia, but at the same time the
Government shall develop and implement the foreign
policy of the Republic of Armenia jointly with the Pre-
sident of the Republic. There is also very significant that
the procedure for the organization of operations of the
Government and other public administration bodies under
the Government shall upon the submission of the Prime
Minister be defined by the decree of the President of the
Republic (The Constitution of The Republic of Armenia,
1995). This constitutional norm shows that presidential
role is very important in executive power.
As in Georgia, Armenian president has a right toparticipate in settings of Government of Armenia. The
constitution defines that the Prime Minister shall super-
vise the Government activities and coordinate the work of
the Ministers, shall convene and chair the Government
sittings, but the President of the Republic may convene
and chair a sitting of the Government on issues related to
the foreign policy, defense and national security. The Pre-
sident of the Republic can suspend the effect of a Gov-
ernment decision for a period of one month and make an
official request to the Constitutional Court for the ver-
ification of its compliance with the Constitution and laws.
Fundamental constitutional amendments were adopted
in Armenia in 2015 and will change the country from
semi-presidentialism to being a parliamentary republic.
According these changes the President is head of state, but
will be elected by National Assembly for seven years of
term. Presidential power will be weak and Formation of
government would be absolutely depends on parliamen-
tary majority. The next Parliamentary election in Armenia
is expected in 2017 and new constitutional framework will
impact on government formation process.
Based on constitutional norms of Armenia and Georgia,
we are able to conclude that main actors in formation of
Government in these countries are President and Parlia-
ment. Formally constitution determines that nomination
of Prime-minister and formation of cabinet must be based
on composition of political parties in the Parliament, but
Presidential influence is strong on this process as the
President is decision maker after cabinet formation and
personally is able to schedule agenda of the government.
Thus, constitutional powers of President and Parliament
are significant factors in formation of government in Ar-
menia and Georgia and causes formation of different types
of government. With constitutional mechanisms, we will
consider political context of countries after elections have
significant impacts on government formation process. The
next paragraphs will show analyses of political results of
government formation in interdisciplinary view of points.3. Government formation in Central and Eastern
Europe
Different types of Semi-presidential and Parliamentary
constitutions have countries in Central and Eastern Europe
where a lot of constitutional changes were provided since
1990s. The constitutional system is significant in govern-
ment formation in these countries, but level of political
competition is different comparable to South Caucasus
countries. Competition and collaboration between political
parties ensure formation of different types of governments
in parliamentary democracies. As recent works and poli-
tical practice show, the most basic types of governments
are as follows: single-party majority government (where
one party in government controls a parliamentary major-
ity), minimal-winning coalition government (where there
is more than one party in government and where the
support of each party is needed to maintain a parliamen-
tary majority), surplus coalition government (where there
is more than one party in government and where the
support of at least one party is not needed to maintain a
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ment (where there is one party in government, but no
parliamentary majority) and coalition minority govern-
ment (where there is more than one party in government
and where the government does not control a parlia-
mentary majority). In the literature on coalition theory,
government formation is considered as a bargaining game
(Lupia & Strom, 2010). There are basic bargaining princi-
ples and factors that may have an influence on govern-
ment formation and cause the formation of one type of
government rather than another. The factors that may
have an impact on the government formation include:
contextual factors, resource distribution among political
actors, politicians' preferences, institutional framework,
critical events.
If we chart the distribution of the various types of
governments identified from 1990 to 2012, then we find
some differences in government formation both across
countries and between Western European and in Central
and Eastern European countries (Table 1).
As is obvious, there are great deals of similarities be-
tween Western European and Central and Eastern Eur-
opean countries. One of the most common types of gov-
ernments is the minimum winning coalition majority
government for Western and Central European as well as
Eastern European countries. Another similarity is thatTable 1
Government Types in Western and Central and Eastern European Countries (1
database (PARLINE, 2015).
Country Minimum-Winning
Single-party Majority
Government Number
(%)
Minimum-Winning
Coalition Majority
Government Number
(%)
Surplus-
Governm
ber (%)
West European Countries
Austria 0 (0) 10 (91) 0 (0)
Belgium 0 (0) 4 (33.3) 6 (50)
Denmark 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Finland 0 (0) 0 (0) 11 (100)
France 0 (0) 5 (29.4) 7 (41.1)
Germany 0 (0) 5 (71.4) 2 (28.6)
Greece 7 (77.8) 0 (0) 1 (11.1)
Iceland 0(0) 8 (88.9) 0 (0)
Ireland 0 (0) 5 (62.5) 0 (0)
Italy 0 (0) 4 (33.4) 5 (41.6)
Luxembourg 0 (0) 7 (100) 0 (0)
Netherlands 0 (0) 5 (83.3) 1 (16.7)
Norway 0 (0) 2 (18.2) 0 (0)
Portugal 3 (33.3) 3 (33.3) 0 (0)
Spain 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
Sweden 0 (0) 1 (14.2) 0 (0)
United Kingdom 6 (85.8) 1 (14.2) 0 (0)
Overall 17 (11) 61 (38) 33 (20)
Central and East European Countries
Bulgaria 1 (14.3) 2 (28.5) 1 (14.3)
Czech Republic 0 (0) 7 (53.9) 1 (7.7)
Estonia 0 (0) 9 (69.2) 0 (0)
Hungary 0 (0) 3 (30) 5 (50)
Latvia 1 (4.7) 5 (23.9) 6 (28.5)
Lithuania 2 (12.5) 4 (25) 3 (18.7)
Poland 0 (0) 8 (44.4) 5 (27.8)
Romania 1 (5.6) 1 (5.6) 4 (22.2)
Slovakia 1 (6.6) 8 (53.3) 3 (20)
Slovenia 0 (0) 8 (57.1) 2 (14.3)
Overall 6 (4) 55 (38) 30 (21)there is almost the same percentage of surplus majority
government in Western European as well as Central and
Eastern European countries. At the same time, there are
some differences between these two groups of countries.
For example, there are more single-party majority gov-
ernments in Western European countries than in Central
and Eastern European countries where minority govern-
ments are more common.
In addition, we see variation between the countries
regarding the types of governments. Some countries are
highly prone to particular types of government. For ex-
ample, minimum-winning coalition majority government
is a very common type of government in Austria, Iceland
and Luxemburg, whereas single-party minority govern-
ment tends to be common in Spain, Sweden, Norway and
Portugal. As for minimum-winning, single-party majority
government, it is common in Greece, the United Kingdom
and Portugal. Moreover, a surplus majority government is
common in Finland and a minority coalition government
in Denmark.
There is also a very interesting variation in Central and
Eastern European countries. For example, Romania is
prone to minority coalition government, whereas Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia tend to have
minimum-winning, single-party majority government,
even though this type of government is not very common990–2012).Source: Author's calculation from Inter-Parliamentary Unions
Majority
ent Num-
Single-party Min-
ority Government
Number (%)
Minority coalition
Government Num-
ber (%)
Sum Num-
ber (%)
0 (0) 1 (9) 11 (100)
0 (0) 2 (16.7) 12 (100)
0 (0) 10 (100) 10 (100)
0 (0) 0 (0) 11 (100)
1 (6) 4 (23.5) 17 (100)
0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (100)
1 (11.1) 0 (0) 9 (100)
0 (0) 1 (11.1) 9 (100)
0 (0) 3 (37.5) 8 (100)
0 (0) 3 (25) 12 (100)
0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (100)
0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (100)
3 (27.2) 6 (54.6) 11 (100)
3 (33.3) 0 (0) 9 (100)
6 (75) 0 (0) 8 (100)
4 (57.2) 2 (28.6) 7 (100)
0 (0%) 0 (0) 7 (100)
18 (11) 32 (20) 161 (100)
3 (42.9) 0 (0) 7 (100)
2 (15.4) 3 (23) 13 (100)
2 (15.4) 2 (15.4) 13 (100)
1 (10) 1 (10) 10 (100)
0 (0) 9 (42.9) 21 (100)
0 (0) 7 (43.8) 16 (100)
1 (5.6) 4 (22.2) 18 (100)
1 (5.6) 11 (61) 18 (100)
1 (6.6) 2 (40) 15 (100)
0 (0) 4 (28.6) 14 (100)
11 (8) 43 (30) 145 (100)
Table 2
Political Parties in the Parliament of Armenia in 2003–2012.Source: Au-
thor's calculation from Inter-Parliamentary Unions database (Parline,
2015).
Political Parties No. of seats in parliament (% of
seats)
2003 2007 2012
Republican Party of Armenia
(HHK)
33 (25) 65 (50) 69 (53)
Artarutiun (Justice) Bloc 14 (11)
Orinats Yerkir (Rule of Law Party) 19 (15) 9 (7) 6 (5)
Armenian Revolutionary Federa-
tion (Dashnaktsutiun)
11 (8) 16 (12) 6 (5)
National Unity Party 9 (7)
United Labour Party 6 (5)
Republic Party 1 (1)
Pan-Armenian Worker's Party 1 (1)
Prosperous Armenia Party 25 (19) 37 (28)
Armenian National Congress
(ANC)
7 (5)
Heritage Party (HP) 7 (5) 5 (4)
Dashink Party 1 (1)
Non-partisans, Independents 37 (28) 8 (6) 1 (1)
Total number of seats (%) 131
(100)
131
(100)
131 (100)
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Also a very important point is that some countries do not
experience certain types of government at all. For example
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and
other countries in Western Europe have never had a
minimum-winning single-party majority government;
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
did not have a single-party minority government during
the 1990–2012 period.
In sum, the research presents various types of govern-
ment formation. Generally, these explanations focus on
the motivations of political parties and the context in
which government formation occurs. When we look at the
types of governments that have been formed, it is clear
that there is a considerable number of similarities between
more established and newer democracies overall. How-
ever, there is great variation across countries within each
of these blocks.
Now the paper turns to government formation in the
Caucasus to identify the patterns of government formation
there and explain the different patterns that can be
observed.4. The choice of Armenia and Georgia
The goal of this section is to determine whether pat-
terns of government formation identified in Western and
Central and Eastern Europe apply to the Caucasus. In one
way, democracy is less established in this region and the
political context is very different. This would lead one to
think that very different patterns of government formation
would be observed. However, as the research reveals, all
patterns of government formation were similar in both
Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. This
suggests that we might expect equivalent similarities in
the South Caucasus countries; as such, to what extent is
government formation similar within different areas?
It was decided to focus on the situation in Armenia and
Georgia in order to get answers to the questions raised
above. This choice was conditioned by several reasons:
first, both countries are new democracies and have the
same regional and political contexts. Secondly, they are
semi-presidential countries and have the same basic con-
stitutional framework as it relates to the formation of
government formation and its operation. Third, although
they have had different democratic trajectories since 1990,
there are some similarities. For example, according to
Freedom House, Armenia and Georgia have the same index
regarding democratic development and both countries are
defined as partly free countries (Freedom House, 2013).
Our research is related to the period from 2003 to the
present time since this is the first time when relatively free
elections took place in both countries. I start with the
identification of the types of governments formed in Ar-
menia and Georgia and then examine the reasons of for-
mation of different types of governments.5. Government formation in Armenia and Georgia
Three parliamentary elections have been held in Ar-
menia and Georgia since 2003. The political practice of
these countries confirmed that there were various con-
figurations of political parties in parliament. Table 2 shows
a distribution of parliamentary seats between political
parties in Armenia. There was a greater fragmentation of
party representatives in the legislature after the 2003
elections than after the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary
elections when the role of the Republican Party of Armenia
(HHK) was increased (Table 2). The results of the 2003
parliamentary elections show that not a single political
party obtained a majority in parliament. It was a very
unusual situation in Armenia when parliamentary seats
were divided among six political parties. All political par-
ties could have participated in formation of parliamentary
majority since every party had important positions in
parliament.
The situation following the parliamentary elections of
2007 greatly differs from 2012. These two elections could
be considered to be similar cases. The first and most im-
portant point here is that, even though HHK was ex-
tremely close to gaining a majority with 65 seats in par-
liament after the 2003 elections, it failed to win a majority.
Secondly, a strong position was obtained by a newly cre-
ated political party – Prosperous Armenia Party – after the
2003 elections and the party became the second largest
political group in the parliament of Armenia. At the same
time, the support of other political parties such as Orinats
Yerkir, National Unity Party and the United Labour Party,
decreased. The latter two parties did not manage to exceed
the election barrier. The situation has had a little bit dif-
ferent character after the 2012 parliamentary elections
when the HHK obtained a majority in parliament. As a
result, the formation of a single party, parliamentary
Table 3
Composition of Government in Armenia in 2003–2012.Source: Author's
calculation form panarmenian.net (2015) and website of the Government
of Republic of Armenia (2015).
Political Parties No. of seats in government (% of
seats)
2003 2007 2012
Republican Party of Armenia
(HHK)
8 (53) 8 (50) 11 (57.9)
Orinats Yerkir (Rule of Law
Party)
3 (20) 1 (6) 3 (15.8)
Armenian Revolutionary Party
(Dashnaktsutyun)
3 (20) 3 (18)
Prosperous Armenia Party 2 (13)
Non-partisan 1 (7) 2 (13) 5 (26.3)
Overall 15 (100) 16 (100) 19(100)
1 The United National Movement obtained 43% of seats in the 2012
parliamentary elections, but since the elections, 13 persons have left the
party (some of them are now independent majoritarians and not mem-
bers of factions), the number of seats held by the UNM decreased.
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there were again an increased number of seats obtained by
the Prosperous Armenia Party and the party became the
second largest political group in parliament. Orinats Yerkir,
Dashnaktsutiun and Heritage Party lost support in parlia-
ment through the last elections.
The fragmentation of political parties was an important
factor in the formation of different types of governments
in Armenia. As Table 3 reveals, several types of govern-
ments could have formed after the 2003 parliamentary
elections (Table 3). First of all, a parliamentary majority
could have been formed by HHK, Artarutiun (Justice) Bloc
and Orinats Yerkir (Rule of Law Party) with 66 seats in
parliament. Secondly, a parliamentary majority with 69
seats could have been formed by HHK, Orinats Yerkir (Rule
of Law Party), Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dash-
naktsutiun) and United Labour Party. Third, a parliamen-
tary majority could have been formed by HHK, Artarutiun
(Justice) Bloc, Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dash-
naktsutiun) and National Unity Party with 67 seats in
parliament. Thus, there were various possibilities to form
minimum-winning coalition majority government, but in
the end a minority coalition government was formed by
HHK, Orinats Yerkir and Federation (Dashnaktsutiun)
(Table 4).
The situation changed after Orinats Yerkir Party had left
the ruling coalition in 2006 (Table 5). As a result, the party
split into two parts (Asberez, 2006). Ten lawmakers who
left Orinats Yerkir's parliamentary faction established
themselves as independents, retaining a pro-governmental
orientation. The party also lost the three cabinet portfolios
allocated to it under the 2003 power-sharing agreement.
After the decision of Orinats Yerkir to leave the coali-
tion, the government, now comprising of the Republican
Party (with 33 seats) and the Armenian Revolutionary
Faction (ARF) Dashnaks (with 11 seats), did not control a
majority in the National Assembly, but together with other
political parties and independent members of parliament
still controlled the parliament's decisions process on
strategic issues (Table 6).
There was a relatively different political context in 2007
because party representation in parliament changed after
the elections. In theory five political parties-HHK, OrinatsYerkir, Dashnaktsutyun, Prosperous Armenia Party and
Heritage Party could have participated in the formation of
a parliamentary majority. First of all, HHK could have
formed a majority with the support of independent
members of parliament as it was experienced in 2006–
2007. Therefore, a formation of a single party government
was expected. On the other hand, it was also possible to
form a minimum-winning coalition majority government
with any other political party (Dashnaktsutiun, Orinats
Yerkir Prosperous Armenia Party, Heritage Party, Dashink
Party). Eventually, a surplus majority government was
formed.
There was also an unexpected change in government
after the 2007 parliamentary elections. In 2009, the Ar-
menian Revolutionary Federation Party left the coalition in
protest against the signing of protocols with Turkey. This
party was a partner of the Republican Party of Armenia,
Orinats Yerkir and Prosperous Armenia Party in coalition.
Despite this change in the coalition's composition, the type
of government was not a subject to change, because the
Republican Party of Armenia still had a majority with Or-
inats Yerkir and it was still a surplus majority government.
The formation of a single-party majority government
was expected in 2012, when the Republican Party of Ar-
menia obtained a majority in parliament. Even so, the
second party – Prosperous Armenia Party that was asked
by the HHK to form a coalition government, rejected the
suggestion. A coalition government was then formed with
Orinats Yerkir. So, the 2012 parliamentary elections led to
the formation of a surplus majority government.
The situation in Georgia has been different since 2003.
Here, the political context can be divided into two differ-
ent periods: the elections of 2004–2012 and October
elections of 2012 (Table 7). The first two elections had a
very low level of party fragmentation. As Table 5 shows,
the National Movement-Democrats obtained a large ma-
jority in parliament after the 2004 elections. Only one
political block – the “Right Opposition” – exceeded the 7%
election threshold and was represented in parliament. The
National Movement-Democrats formed a single party
majority government. A broad opposition, pre-election
coalition was created before the 2008 parliamentary
elections, but the political situation remained largely the
same. Giorgi Targamadze-Christian-Democrats, Shalva
Natelashvili-Labour Party, the Republican Party and the
“Joint Opposition” block obtained seats in parliament.
However, with its majority, the United National Movement
again formed a single party majority. See Table 7.
The political context changed after the 2012 parlia-
mentary elections, when the United National Movement
lost the elections. As Table 7 illustrates, the United Na-
tional Movement has only 34.6% of seats in parliament1
whereas, the “Georgian Dream” coalition obtained a par-
liamentary majority. The Georgian Dream coalition con-
sisted of representatives of nine political parties on the
Georgian Dream electoral list – Georgian Dream-
Table 4
Government support in parliament.Source: Author's calculation form
panarmenian.net (2015) and website of the Government of Republic of
Armenia (2015).
Political Parties No. of seats in parliament (% of seats)
2003 2007 2012
Republican Party of
Armenia (HHK)
33 (25) 65 (49.62) 69 (53)
Orinats Yerkir (Rule
of Law Party)
19 (15) 9 (7) 6 (5)
Armenian Revolu-
tionary Party
(Dashnaktsutyun)
11 (8) 16 (12)
Prosperous Armenia
Party
25 (19)
Overall 63 (48) 115 (87.62) 75(58)
Type of
government
Minority coa-
lition
Government
Surplus ma-
jority
government
Surplus ma-
jority
government
Table 5
Composition of Government in Armenia in 2006–2007.Source: Author's
calculation form panarmenian.net (2015) and website of the Government
of Republic of Armenia (2015).
Political Parties No. of seats in government
(% of seats)
2006–2007
Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) 8 (53)
Armenian Revolutionary Party
(Dashnaktsutyun)
3 (20)
Non-partisana 4 (27)
a Non-partisans consist of three Orinats Yerkir cabinet members who
saved posts after withdrawing the Orinats Yerkir Party from the gov-
ernment, Orinats Yerkir Members Follow Baghdasarian Out of Govern-
ment, http://asbarez.com/53656/orinats-yerkir-members-follow-baghda
sarian-out-of-government/, Monday, May 15th, 2006 [Accessed:
12.05.2012].
Table 6
Government support in parliament.Source: Author's calculation form
panarmenian.net (2015) and website of the Government of Republic of
Armenia (2015).
Political Parties No. of seats in parliament (%
of seats)
2006–2007
Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) 33 (25)
Armenian Revolutionary Party
(Dashnaktsutyun)
11 (8)
Type of government Minority coalition
Government
Table 7
Political Parties in Parliament in Georgia, 2004–2012.Source: Author's
calculation from Inter-Parliamentary Unions database (2015) and party
list of Georgian Dream Coalition (Georgian Dream, 2012), final protocol of
2012 elections (Election administration of Georgia, 2012) and website of
the parliament of Georgia (Parliament of Georgia, 2012)
Political parties No. of seats in parliament (% of
seats)
2004 2008 2012
National Movement-Democrats 130 (87)
The United National Movement 119 (79.4) 40 (26.6)
The National Movement
Majoritariansa
6 (4)
The National Movement –
Regions
6 (4)
Right Opposition 15 (10)
“The Joint Opposition (National
Council New Rights)”
17 (11.3)
“Giorgi Targamadze-Christian
-Democrats”
6 (4)
“Shalva Natelashvili-Labor
Party”
6 (4)
Republican Party 5 (3) 2 (1.3)
Georgian Dream-Democratic
Georgia (GDDG)
48 (32)
Georgian Dream-Free Demo-
crats (GDFD)
10 (6.7)
Georgian Dream-Republicans
(GDR)
9 (6)
Conservative Party 6 (4)
Georgian Forum 6 (4)
The Georgian Dream -
Entrepreneurs
6 (4)
Non-party, Independent
Majoritariansb
6 (4)
Non-partisans, out of factionc 7 (4.7)
Total number of seats (%)
a After 2012 parliamentary election The United National Movement
has been divided into three parliamentary factions: The United National
Movement, The National Movement Majoritarians and The National
Movement – Regions. They are now members of parliamentary minority
in the Parliament of Georgia.
b There are former members of UNM who have been nominated by
the UNM and won parliamentary election in majoritarian districts, but
have left the UNM after the parliamentary election.
c There are MPs who have left the UNM after the parliamentary
election, but did not join any faction in the parliament and Koba Davi-
tashvili who has left the parliamentary majority on August 2, 2013 and
announced to run in the October 27 presidential elections.
Table 8
Government Composition in Georgia, 2004–2012.Source: (Civil Georgia,
2012) and (Parliament of Georgia, 2012).
Political Parties No. of seats in government (% of
seats)
2004 2008 2012
United National Movement 21 (100) 18 (100)
Georgian Dream-Democratic
Georgia (GDDG)
7 (36.9)
Georgian Dream-Free Demo-
crats (GDFD)
4 (21)
Georgian Dream-Republicans
(GDR)
1 (5.3)
Georgian Forum 1 (5.3)
Non-partisans 6 (31.5)
Overall 21 (100) 18 (100) 19 (100)
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Georgian Dream-Republicans, Georgian Forum, Con-
servative Party, Industry Will Save Georgia, People's Party,
Georgian Greens, Social-democrats for Development of
Georgia, and non-partisans. After the elections, there were
various government formation options. For example, a
combination of Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia with
the Georgian Dream-Free Democrats, Georgian Dream-
Republicans, Conservative Party and Georgian Forum could
Table 9
Government support in parliament 2004–2012.Source: (Civil Georgia, 2012) and (Parliament of Georgia, 2012).
Political Parties No. of seats in parliament (% of seats)
2004 2008 2012
National Movement-Democratsa 130 (87)
TheUnitedNationalMovement 119 (79.4)
Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GDDG) 48 (32)
Georgian Dream-Free Democrats (GDFD) 10 (6.7)
Georgian Dream-Republicans (GDR) 9 (6)
Georgian Forum 6 (4)
Overall 130 (87) 119 (79.4) 73 (?)
Type of government Single Party Majority
Government
Single Party Majority
Government
Minority Coalition
Government
a National Movement-Democrats was an electoral block formed before 2004 parliamentary election and consist of political parties: United Democrats,
National Movement, Republican Party and Union of National Forces. United Democrats and National Movement have been united and participated in
parliamentary election 2004 as one party. Representatives of the Republican Party and Union of National Forces have been also included in a new party list.
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ernment. Alternatively a surplus majority government
could have been formed by these parties since they had
more than 51% of seats in parliament together. Despite
these options, a minority coalition Government was
formed by Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia, Georgian
Dream-Free Democrats, Georgian Dream-Republicans and
Georgian Forum (Table 8). Other political parties were part
of the parliamentary majority, but they did not have posts
in the coalition government (Table 9).
Based on all of the above mentioned, it is obvious that
government formation processes in Armenia and Georgia
were not typical of Europe generally. We see that a surplus
majority government was common in Armenia (2007,
2012) and single party majority government in Georgia
(2004, 2008) while these types of governments are less
common in Europe. Minimum-winning coalition, majority
governments and minority coalition governments are
more typical of Western and Central Europe, while we
observed two cases of minority coalition government in
Armenia (2003, 2006) and one case in Georgia after the
2012 parliamentary elections. How can the formation of
these patterns of governments be explained?6. Motivations of formation of different types of gov-
ernments in Armenia
One of the most important factors of government for-
mation in Armenia is the institutional framework of the
country. There is a semi-presidential constitution in Ar-
menia and political parties are not even the main actors in
the government formation. The role of president is also
very important as he/she has very strong powers unlike
the presidents in many European semi-presidential coun-
tries. According to Siaroff's measure of presidential power,
Armenia has 6and Georgia 7 scores on a scale from 0 to
9 while the scores, for example, in Bulgaria equal to 3, the
score in Croatia is 4, Finland 2, Germany 5, Ireland 3, Li-
thuania 4 and Macedonia 4 (Siaroff, 2003, p. 299). The
president (who might be a partisan figure) is the main
political actor in government formation as constitutionally
she/he appoints the government nominated by theparliamentary majority after the parliamentary elections.
Moreover, the president appoints three ministers in gov-
ernment so that in that way it is possible to influence the
government formation process. The main aim of parties is
to win the presidency. Government formation is a sec-
ondary issue to coalition-building for the presidential
election. The formation of government mainly depends on
the decision of the president. For example, after the 2012
parliamentary elections the President Serzh Sargsyan an-
nounced that all ministers in Government would continue
to exercise their responsibility in the Government. He also
appointed non-partisan ministers in the government. That
is why direct presidential elections (scheduled on February
18, 2013 after the parliamentary elections on May 6, 2012)
had an impact on political parties' campaigns in the par-
liamentary elections as well as the government formation
after the parliamentary elections. Pre-election competition
among the political parties around their presidential can-
didates influenced the government formation process.
Armenia experienced cases when political parties did not
stand a candidate at the presidential elections, but sup-
ported candidates from other political parties. Thus,
usually these were only the parties supporting the win-
ning presidential candidate that were invited to coalition
government during the last parliamentary elections.
In order to make it clear why some political parties did
not join, whereas others went to the government, we need
to analyze the relationship between the political parties
and president before and during the presidential elections.
The configuration of political parties before the 2003
presidential and parliamentary elections was mainly con-
ditioned by the October 27, 1999 attack on the National
Assembly, when the Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, a
leader of the Republican Party of Armenia, the Speaker of
Parliament Karen Demirchyan, a leader of the Peoples
Party and six other parliamentarians were assassinated. It
was a significant event in Armenian politics which chan-
ged the political configuration in the country. It led to a
split between the People's Party and the Republican Party
of Armenia, which had been members of the Unity Block
previously with a majority in parliament. After the in-
cident, the Armenian People's Party moved in opposition.
Later some members of the Republican Party of Armenia
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Party. Consequently, the 2003 presidential elections were
very significant for the consolidation of political parties
against President Robert Kocharyan's power.
There was a very intensive pre-election campaign in
2003 and political parties were divided into two political
camps around two presidential candidates, Stepan De-
mirchian, the son of the murdered speaker of parliament,
Karen Demirchyan, from the “Justice” alliance,2 and Robert
Kocharian supported by Republican Party of Armenia, Or-
inats Yerkir and Armenian Revolutionary Federation-
Dashnaktsutiun. In the first round of the election, Ko-
charian officially received 49.48% of votes, followed by
Stepan Demirchian with 28.22%. Kocharian was reelected
in the second round with 67.44% of the votes, while De-
mirchian obtained 32.56%. The opposition refused to re-
cognize the results of the elections (Inter-Parliamentary
Union, 2003). In this situation political parties which
supported Demirchyan in the second round of presidential
elections and were enrolled in Justice Alliance could not
join the coalition government.
On the other hand, there was another group of political
parties, specifically the “Rule of Law” party and the Ar-
menian Revolutionary Federation willing to form a min-
ority coalition government with the Republican Party of
Armenia. These political parties officially supported Ko-
charian's candidacy in the presidential elections and as the
political partners were invited by the president into the
coalition government. President Kocharian, who was re-
elected for his second round, also needed to re-establish
the legitimacy of presidential power after the disputed
election and the support of other parties was important in
this regard. He suggested forming a coalition government
between the Republican Party of Armenia, Orinats Yerkir
and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Despite dis-
agreements over some substantive policy issues, they
agreed. Therefore, in 2003 Kocharian's only option was a
minority coalition government with two political partners.
The motivation of Orinats Yerkir and Armenian Revolu-
tionary Federation was most likely office-seeking. For ex-
ample, in addition to their government posts, the leader of
Orinats Yerkir was appointed on the post of chair of the
National Assembly.
The Republican Party of Armenia had a majority in
parliament after the 2007 parliamentary elections and
could have formed a single-party majority government,
but decided to form a surplus majority government with
the Rule of Law Party, Dashnaktsutyun and Prosperous
Armenia Party. The presidency was still an important
contextual factor here. It is important to note that this was
President Kocharian's last term in office and he needed to
transfer power to the candidate of his preference, Serzh
Sargsyan, who was appointed as prime minister on March
26, 2007. Sargsyan invited Kocharian's political partners to
the last coalition government – Orinats Yerkir and Arme-
nian Revolutionary Federation – into the coalition after the2 The Justice Bloc consisted of: Armenian People's Party, Republic
Party, National Democratic Union, National Democratic Party, National
Democratic Alliance, Armenian Democratic Party, Constitutional Right
Union (formerly part of “Right & Accord”).parliamentary elections on May 12, 2007. Again, he needed
their support for the presidential election. He also invited
the newly established Prosperous Armenia Party, which
was a political project founded by former President Ko-
charyan and led by the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, a key
business partner of Kocharyan (Petrosyan, 2010, p. 10). The
Prosperous Armenia Party did not have its own pre-
sidential candidate and supported Sargsyan. Orinats Yerkir
did run a candidate in the presidential election, but he
opposed to the main opposition candidate, former Pre-
sident Levon Ter-Petrosyan, andreally supported Sargsyan
(Fuller, 2008). In contrast, the Heritage party and Dashink
Party were not invited to join the government. The Heri-
tage Party was led by Raffi Hovannisian, the first Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia appointed by
President Ter-Petrosyan, has been opposed against the
ruling coalition and supported Levon Ter-Petrosyan.
Therefore, the Heritage party could not join the govern-
ment. The Dashink Party had only one member in parlia-
ment after the 2007 elections and the party was not in-
vited into the coalition as its presence in the coalition was
not important.
Six political parties obtained seats in parliament after
the 2012 parliamentary elections. Even though the Re-
publican Party of Armenia with 53% of seats did not need
the support of any other political party and could form a
single party majority government, the Rule of Law Party
was included in surplus majority government. Presidential
power and the 2008 presidential elections can still be di-
rectly linked to the formation of this government. The
following parties nominated their own presidential can-
didates: Republican Party of Armenia, Armenian Revolu-
tionary Federation, Rule of Law Party and Armenian Na-
tional Congress. The Prosperous Armenia Party supported
the candidate of the Republican Party of Armenia. The
Armenian Revolutionary Federation went into the coali-
tion government in 2008, but left the coalition in 2009in
protest against the signing of protocols with Turkey by the
government. Consequently, in 2012 the ARF was not ex-
pected to join the coalition. The Armenian National Con-
gress could not go into government as the party's pre-
sidential candidate, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, did not recognize
the legitimacy of the election. The Prosperous Armenia
Party supported Serzh Sargsyan's presidential candidacy,
but later announced that it would not be joining a new
government (Asbarez, 2012). One of the reasons for not
going in government was that the party leader, Gagik
Tsarukyan, wanted the office of Prime Minister and did not
enter the coalition when the party was not able to gain this
position (Lütem, 2012).
Only the Orinats Yerkir agreed to participate in the
formation of the government. The leader of the party, Ar-
tur Baghdasaryan, did not take part in protests against the
election led by Levon Ter-Petrossian after the presidential
elections. Moreover, he recognized the legitimacy of the
victory of Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan on February 29,
2008 and received the post of Secretary of the National
Security Council in the coalition government. Therefore,
Orinats Yerkir appeared to have an office-seeking
motivation.
3 The leader of Georgian Dream-Free Democrats, Irakli Alasania, a
former Ambassador of Georgia to the UN, was appointed as Defense
minister and vice-prime minister, but later was dismissed from the post
of vice-prime minister by the prime-minister. The official reason was
considering of his candidate for presidency by Alasania without co-or-
dination with the coalition leadership
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ernments in Georgia
Two single-party majority governments and one minority
coalition government were formed in Georgia from 2004 to
2012. A single-party majority government was formed after
the 2004 and the 2008 parliamentary elections. Unlike the
situation in Armenia in 2007 and 2012 there was no surplus
majority government. The Rose Revolution in 2003, the early
presidential elections in 2008 and the presidency and pre-
sidential elections in general were the main reasons. In Ar-
menia, the President was elected with 52% of the vote after
two ballots whereas in 2004 President Saakashvili was
elected with 96% of votes in the first round. Consequently, the
President did not need to collaborate with any other political
parties. Furthermore, in 2008 parliamentary elections were
directly linked to the early presidential elections of that year,
which was held after a series of anti-government demon-
strations in November 2007. Seven presidential candidates
ran at 2008 presidential elections and Levan Gachechiladze,
the main rival of President Saakashvili, was supported by the
‘National Council’, a coalition of nine opposition parties.
Saakashvili won the elections with 53.47% of the votes for the
first round, but the opposition parties protested the result
until the parliamentary elections on May 21, 2008. The
Central Election Commission announced that the United
National Movement won the parliamentary elections with
59.18%. The Joint Opposition – the National Council-New
Rights, obtained only 17.73%, while the Christian Demo-
cratic Party and the Labour Party also exceeded the election
threshold and obtained seats in parliament. Thus, the 2008
parliamentary elections were in fact just the continuation of
the protests against President Saakashvili after the political
crisis of November 2007. Therefore, the Joint Opposition
could not join a surplus majority government as this bloc
did not recognize a legitimacy of the election results. In-
deed, it refused to even enter the parliament. The Christian
Democratic Party could not go into the government as the
party was the vehicle of former journalists of a private
television station, Imedi TV, which closed in November
2007 after a mass protest against the government. The
Georgian Labour Party also could not enter the government
because Shalva Natelashvili, the chairman and the founder
of the party, was one of the presidential candidates in 2008
presidential elections and did not recognize the legitimacy
of the election results. Thus, a single-party majority gov-
ernment was the only option.
In 2012 the situation was different. Ten political parties
obtained seats in parliament after the elections. The ruling
United National Movement party lost the elections and
obtained only 43% of seats in parliament. Consequently,
although, a minimum-winning coalition and a surplus
majority coalition could have been formed, a minority
coalition government was formed instead. Office seeking
motivations were important. It seems that different poli-
tical parties achieved an agreement not only on the dis-
tribution of posts in the government, but the posts in the
parliament as well. For example, Zviad Dzidziguri, leader
of the Conservative Party was nominated as the Vice-
speaker, the leader of the Industry Will Save Georgia be-
came a chairman of the committee of Sector Economy andEconomic Policy and one of the leaders of Georgian Forum
Gubaz Sanikidze became the chairman of the committee of
Diaspora and Caucasus Issues.
This agreement had an impact on the composition of
the cabinet. There are 19 ministers in the government out
of which only 13 are partisans. The six non-partisan min-
isters are technocrats, but have a support of PM and the
leader on the Georgian Dream list, Bidzina Ivanishvili. The
Minister of Healthcare, Davit Sergeenko, was the director
of the local medical clinic in Ivanishvili's district Chorvila
and the Minister of the Economy, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, was
the president of Ivanishvili's company “Kartu Group”. Of-
ficially they are not members of any party, but have close
contacts to Bidzina Ivanishvili. PM Ivanishvili's position as
a billionaire and successful businessman was decisive in
the selection of economic team's ministers. In these cir-
cumstances 13 ministers were appointed by Ivanishvili
and only 6 posts were available to be distributed between
three coalition parties (Georgian Dream-Free Democrats,
Georgian Dream-Republicans and Georgian Forum). Thus,
this explains why there were so few parties in the gov-
ernment, but it interesting why it was only Georgian For-
um that joined the government whereas others did not.
The inclusion of Georgian Forumwas motivated by policy-
seeking. They accepted the post of the Minister of Internally
Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accom-
modation and Refugees. The term Occupied Territories refer to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The leader of Georgian Forum is
Kakha Shartava. His father, Jiuli Shartava, was the Chairman of
Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and
was killed publicly in 1993 by Abkhazian soldiers in Sokhumi.
While Kakha Shartava did not accept the invitation to be part
of the government personally, a party colleague, David
Darakhvelidze, has appointed on the post of minister. Office-
seeking motivations were also present. Georgian Forum
eventually gained positions outside the cabinet, including the
President of the National Bank and the Chairman of the
Chamber of Control of Georgia (Rekhviashvili, 2012). The party
had well-known candidates for both positions and they were
appointed on October 8, 2013 when the posts became vacant.
Policy-seeking could be also a motivation for the Georgian
Dream-Free Democrats and the Georgian Dream-Republicans.
These two parties had almost the same results in the parlia-
mentary elections, but the Georgian Dream-Free Democrats
received four positions, whereas the Georgian Dream-Re-
publicans received just one. The Georgian Dream-Free De-
mocrats had a good team of experienced politicians with
diplomatic and legal careers and they were appointed to the
Ministries of Defense,3 Justice, Diaspora and European
Integration. Similarly, the Georgian Dream-Republicans held
the post of State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration,
which is mainly responsible for issues related to elaborating
and suggesting proposals for peacekeeping in the Autono-
mous Republic of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetia
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well-known Georgian expert in issues related to these re-
gions and has very good personal contacts with officials of
these unrecognized regions. The process of government
formation showed that the professional activities and ex-
periences of political parties were key points for joining the
government.
Finally, one of the significant factors in the formation of a
minority coalition government was the personalization of
politics. It is a well-known fact that politics is personalized in
the post-Soviet space and the role of political leaders is very
important. In the case of Georgia, the personality of Bidzina
Ivanishvili was very significant. The availability of financial
resources helps to explain the formation of such a broad
electoral coalition and then minority coalition government.
This is the first time in Georgia since 1995 when so many
political parties are represented in the parliament. Previously,
some of these political parties did not manage to exceed the
election barrier and did not play an important political role in
the political life of the country. Some parties were newly
created and had just a little political experience. Most of these
parties did not have any significant support in the 2012
elections and entered parliament only after joining the Geor-
gian Dream pre-election coalition. They would not have been
able to obtain any seats in the parliament without the coali-
tion. As a result, the pre-election coalition was formed around
one leader as it was experienced in Armenia when process of
government formation was highly personalized. There were
cases when Ivanishvili announced the ministers when nobody
from his team had any knowledge about them. This fact helps
to explain why he appointed so many technocratic ministers
who were close to him.8. Conclusions
The results of this interdisciplinary research suggest
that the models of government formation in Armenia and
Georgia are characterized by the domination of single
party and surplus majority governments in a way that is
not entirely typical of Western and Central and Eastern
Europe patterns. Since office and policy-seeking motiva-
tions were present, the evidence suggests that different
contextual factors (for example, strong presidency, weak
party system) are important in Armenia and Georgia.
Unlike European democracies, the presidency, pre-
sidential elections and the personalization of the political
processes are significant determinants of the government
formation processes. Presidents participate in government
formation and with their strong political powers they are
able to impact on the coalition-building process. In addi-
tion, the experience in Georgia shows that a powerful in-
dividual was also able to shape the government formation
process in a period when the president was powerless.
Based on the analyze of constitutional norms of Armenia
and Georgia in comparison to European countries constitu-
tion, relevant constitutional amendment would be re-
commended to the constitutions of these countries to provide
more balanced relations between President, Parliament and
Government, weakening strong presidential powers, ensuremore competition of political parties in coalition formation.
In conclusion, future research on government forma-
tion in newly democratic countries should pay greater
attention to constitutional norms on coalition formation
and contextual political factors in this process.References
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